CRABB, District Judge.
This will be an action that is civil pursuant to 42 U.S.C. В§ 1983. Plaintiff The pay day loan shop of Wisconsin contends that defendant City of Madison has enacted an ordinance that violates plaintiff’s liberties to protection that is equal due procedure and it is unconstitutionally vague. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation.
When plaintiff filed its problem, it desired an initial injunction to avoid defendant from enforcing the ordinance that is allegedly unconstitutional.
Defendant reacted towards the movement and presented a movement for summary judgment at the exact same time, asserting that the appropriate maxims determining the motions had been the exact same. Defendant asked that its movement for summary judgment be addressed without enabling plaintiff time for breakthrough, arguing that any breakthrough will be unneeded. I agreed that breakthrough wouldn’t normally help plaintiff (because legislative choices are “not at the mercy of courtroom factfinding and could be predicated on logical conjecture unsupported by proof or empirical data,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)), and offered its counsel a chance to advise the court whether he desired the opportunity for extra briefing; he penned into the court on August 12, 2004, to express that extra briefing wouldn’t be necessary and that the court should go to determine the movement.
We conclude that defendant’s movement for summary judgment must certanly be awarded because plaintiff cannot show that defendant lacked any basis that is rational legislating the nighttime closing of cash advance shops. Without this kind of showing, plaintiff cannot be successful on its declare that it had been rejected equal security or it was rejected substantive due procedure. The clear wording of this ordinance defeats plaintiff’s declare that its unconstitutionally obscure. (more…)